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Cl\'IL RIGHTS

Can Public Housing Tenants, Alleging Civil Rights

Violations, EnfoTce Federal Housing Lat.o?
h'. Dmwlas
Bowman and Neal De\'ins
0

Brenda E. Wright

v.
City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority
(Docket ~u. 85-5915)

:\ rgrud Octubt•r 6, 1986
ISSUE

In \\'right t•. Cit)' of Rumwhr Rl'tll't'dtJpml'llt cmd Housi11g
;\ullmril,\', the Supreme Court will again enter the thkkt't
of determining whether pri\'ate citizens are authuriled
to enforce congressional mandates. Specifically, \\'right
b c:oncerncd with the a\·ailability of relief under the Ci\'il
Rights Stonute (42 l'.S.C. Section HlS:J, establishing a
prh·atc right of action for "the dcpri\'ation of any rights
scntred by law") in the face of a fairly comprehensi\'e
enforcement scheme entrusted to the Department of
Hnu'iing and t:rb<m De,·elopment.
FACTS

The t:nited States Housing Act of 193i (42 U.S.C.
Section 143i) funds states to pro,·ide affordable housing
for low-income families, either through constructing
ne\\' units or rehabilitating existing but unsafe units.
The Act is administered by the Department of Housing
and l'rban De\'elopment (Hl'D), which has regulatory
anct' enforcement authority. Hl'D enters into Annual
Contributions Contracts (ACC's) with Public Housing
Authorities (PH.-\ 's), which operate and manage the
a'isisted housing units in a gi\'en locality. Each PHA is
bound under its ACC to the regulations established by
Ht:D co\'ering all aspects of housing management and
funding.
The specific pro\'ision of the Act at issue in this case
is the Brooke Amendment (42 U.S.C. Section 143ia).
This subsection pro\'ides that the rent which can be
charged to a tenant in housing assisted under the Act is
limited to a specified percentage of the tenant's income.
The rent charged by definition includes an amount for
utilities. Each PH:\ is required by HL'D to pro\'ide a
reasonable allowance for utilities. Regulations establish
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parameters by which to mea~urc "reasonableness" and
require re\'isions of the allowance under specilk circumstances. A PH:\ has limited discretion in this area.
\\'here a temmt's utilities are furnished b~· the PH.-\,
as in this case, the tenant rc~ceh·cs an 111lnwance of a
certain number of consumption units (kilowatt hour~ or
electricity). Consun1ing more tlmn the allotted mnount
allows the PH:\ to impose a surcharge for the O\'erconsumption. \\'here the tenant pmchases utilities directly
from the supplier, he or she recei\'es an allownnce in
dollars which is deducted from the gross rent chm·ged.
The tenant is responsible for ;m~· consumption abu\'e
that co\'ered by the allow<mce.
Brenda E. \\'right. Geraldine H. Broughman and
Syl\'ia P. Carter, tenants in housing assiited under the
Act, brought this lawsuit on behalf of the class of approximately 1,100 tenants of public low-cost housing in
Roanoke. \\'right, Broughman and Carter are all from
families of "\'ery low income" as defined by federal
statute. All claim that the utilit~· surcharges regularly
added to their rents strains their limited budgets: the
surcharges sometimes ha\'e totaled nearly as much as the
monthly rent charged and ha\'e often taken se\'eral
months to pay off.
\\'right and the others sued their landlord-PH.-\, the
City of Roanoke Recle\'elopment and Housing Authority (RRHA),· alleging that the RRH.-\ had \'iolated the
Brooke Amendment and its implementing regulations.
Specifically, they claimed that the RRH.-\ had estab·
lished unreasonably low utility allowances. and had not
re\'ised them, allowing surcharges to be imposed on a
majority of tenants. The tenants alleged that they were
thus wrongfully O\'ercharged. They based their claim on
the Ci\·il Rights Act of 18il (42 U.S.C. Section 1983)
and their leases with the RRHA.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for RRH:\
(7i1 F.2d 833 (1985)). That court, explicitly following
the approach in Middlm•."C Cout~l)• Sfu't'rag~ AutlroriiJ t•.
~t.•atiol!al Sea Clammm Associalio" (453 U.S. I (1981)) and
Ptmzhursl Slate School and Hospital v. Halclmntm (451 t:.S.
I (1981)), made two inquiries. First, it asked whether a
private right of action is foreclosed by the pro\'isions of
the Act. Second, the court questioned whether the Act
creates the kind of rights for which Section 1983 is an
appropriate remedy-inasmuch as Section 198:1 does
not itself confer any rights.
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.-\s to whether the .-\ct forecloses prh·ate actinns. the
court was unwilling to de\·iate from twn of its recent
cases considering similar questions, Ptrry• t•. Huusiug ,,,.
tlwrity of Cit_\' ofCimrl~stuu (664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 198 I))
and Plltlps t•. Housiug t\utlwrit_v ufl\'uotlniff(i42 F.2d R16
(4th Cir. 198·1)). which answered in the negative. Work·
ing on the premise th<tt for the tenants to ha\'c a right of
action, the statute must either explicitly gram that right
or prm·ide for no other contrary enforcement mecha·
nism, the court emphasized that nothing in the .-\ct
explicitly granted an independent right of action to
tenants. The court further noted th:n the Act was cle:tr
in granting HL'D full administrath·e and enforcement
powers-including the most effecth·e enforcement tool:
the power to terminate funding. This combination was
belie\'ed to be compelling e\'idence that Congress did
not intend to \'est a right of action in the tenants, but
rather intended fur Ht:D to enforce the regulations on
the tenants' behalf.
The court also found it significant that. while the Act
confers a benefit upon the tenants, the actual assismncc
pro\'ided goes to the st:lte, making the tenants onl)
indirect beneficiaries. For that reason, the court con·
eluded th<tt the Act did not create any legally cognizable
rights in the tenants .
.-\s to the question of whether Section 19S:l is ;m
appropriate remedy, the court again refused tu cJe,·i:ne
from Pllrlpf in concluding that the .-\ct does not grmu
the kind of right for which Section 1983 pro\'ides a
remed~·· The only stated reason for this conclusion is
that the court considered it highly unlikely that Congress intended for "federal courts to make the necessary
computations regarding utility allowances that would be
requirec to a(ljudicate indh·idual claims of right." This is
apparently a corollary to the court's view that the proper
forum for the tenants would be the state courts. There,
the tenants might pursue a claim ba~ed on thdr lease
with 'the RRH..-\-a remedy which was explicitl~· endorsed in the court's decision.
The tenants' claim now before the Supreme Court
rests on two funda.nental premises.
The first is that a private right of action under Section 1983 is presumed to exist whene\·er a federal right
is conferred. Under this view, the presumption can be
overcome only by showing congressiomtl intent specifi·
cally to deny such a right of action.
The second is that the Brooke Amendment limiting
the rent chargeable to tenants creates a right in the
tenant to limited rent. This is the necessary found;uion
of the argument that the RRHA deprived the tenants of
their rights for Section 1983 purposes when the RRH.-\
allegedly disregarded regulations governing setting and
re\·ising utility allowances. The result of the RRHA's
action (or inaction) was that the tenants lmd to pa>·
wrongfully imposed utility surcharges which raised their
gross renlill charge abo\·e the Brooke Amendment ceil·
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ings. Thus it is urgc<lth;llthe RRI-I.\'s allegl·d t;•ilurc to
comply with regulations cuncernin~ a cump"llt.'lll nf
rental charges amounts to a deprinuiun of suhstamh·e
rights. Under the Act. tenant!> could. by \'irtue ul' "unreasonable" utility consumptiun. pay murc than the
rental ceiling e\'en if the RRHA obeyed :til rc:gulatinn".
t:nder the tenants' cumlysis. such payment would
amount tu a \'ulunt;u~ wai\'cr nf the right tu tht.• limited
rent.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
As in any case which concerns implied rights nl' a<:·
tion, Wright raises a fundamental separmion of puwers
concern: whether implementing federallc•w is apprupriately the sole pro\'ince of the Executh e. or whether
vindicating legal rights is sufficiently impnrt;un that pri·
\'ate law enforcement efforts are proper. An impnrt;mt
underlying issue is the means by which the choke is
indicated: wh.u evidence in the Jegislmh·e history or
specific statutory language is conclusi\'e, and what if :my
presumptions exist? While the Fourth Circuit clt>arly
opted for the plenary Executive uuthority model. the
tenants here argue that the effect such an appruadl is
to "divest public housing tenants of any me;mingful
fedet al rights."
The Court might suggest that low utility rates are nut
a "right" under Section 198:!, but arc insteud a nunen·
forceable "benefit." l'nder this approach, the issue of
who has authority to enforce tenmm' rights would become irrele\'itnt. The question of what is a reusonctble
utility rate would simply be viewed as a policy decisiun
left to the program's administrator, Hl'D. Such u ruling
would h:l\'e farreaching consequences, for it would sug·
gest that f~deral aid programs are not suhject 10 judicial
challenge br private litigants.
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ARGUMENTS
For Brtnda E. Wright (Coi/:L(tl of Rrcortl. He'll I)' L. l\'uudu·tml,
312 Cll11rtll .-\t'l'llllt', 51\', RtmntJkr. ~'.-\ 2-llJ/6: lc'l.•plwlu' (i03J
344-2088)

l. The Brooke Amendment, as e\'idencecl by cungres·
sional intent, \'ests public housing tenants with a
substantive right to limited rents.
2. The disposition belO\\' erroneous)~· reduces the avCJilability of the Section 1983 remedy to cases where a
pri\'ate right of action can be implied from a fedc:rnl
statute. The proper approach to the preclusion in·
quiry is a presumption that the Section 1983 right of
action may be used to \'indicate federal rights.
3. The Authority has not met its burden of showing
congressional intent to O\'ercome the presumption
that Section 1983 may be used for private enforcement of the Act: Congress did not expressly preclude
pri\'ate Section 1983 enforcement; Congress did not
supplant Section 1983 with alternate pri\·ate reme·
dies, and Congress' grant of general regulatory auPRE\'IEW

thurity to Hl'D dues not demonstrate intent to
supphmt the statute.
·1. The federal courts must entertain a lease-based claim
which una\'oidably raises a substantial federal question under the Housing Act of 19:li and the implementing regulations.

For the City of Roa11ohe Redet•elopment and Housirrg AuthtJril)' fCmm.frl tJf R1•cord, BCI.\m·tl £. Ht~rris, P.O. Bu.~; i2U,
H•lllllllkt•, \',-\ 2-IOfJ.I; teleplwnt (iOJ) 982--1200}
1. Public housing tenants ha\'e no federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to redress individual grievances arising out or their hmdlurd's
implementation of HUD regulations. The compre-
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hensh·e enfnn.:enwm '\cheme cn•med by the HousingAct and Hl'D sub~idy program c\'inces Congre~s·
intent tu foreclose il Section 1mt\ iiCtion 10 enforce
HUD utility regulations.
2. The claim that RRH:\ brc;~chc!l its le;~se with its tenants is a chtim lor which federal jurisdiction cannot
exist independent of this Section 1~8:\ claim.
3. Damages should not be an a\':til:tblc remedy under
Section 198:3 where the source of rcco\'er~
he
federal grant monies.
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AMICUS BRIEF

In Support of Brenda E. lVright
The i':ation:tl Housing Law Pnuect
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